Abstract-6LoWPAN networks involving wireless sensors consist of resource starving miniature sensor nodes. Since secured authentication of these resource-constrained sensors is one of the important considerations during communication, use of asymmetric key distribution scheme may not be the perfect choice to achieve secure authentication. Recent research shows that Lucky Thirteen attack has compromised Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode for key establishment. Even though EAKES6Lo and S3K techniques for key establishment follow the symmetric key establishment method, they strongly rely on a remote server and trust anchor for secure key distribution. Our proposed Lightweight Authentication Protocol (LAUP) used a symmetric key method with no preshared keys and comprised of four flights to establish authentication and session key distribution between sensors and Edge Router in a 6LoWPAN environment. Each flight uses freshly derived keys from existing information such as PAN ID (Personal Area Network IDentification) and device identities. We formally verified our scheme using the Scyther security protocol verification tool for authentication properties such as Aliveness, Secrecy, Non-Injective Agreement and Non-Injective Synchronization. We simulated and evaluated the proposed LAUP protocol using COOJA simulator with ContikiOS and achieved less computational time and low power consumption compared to existing authentication protocols such as the EAKES6Lo and SAKES.
I. INTRODUCTION
The network of low power sensors called LoWPAN (Low Power Wireless Personal Area Network) consists of small sensors with limited memory, less computational capability and low in resources. 6LoWPAN is one of the most important communication protocols used in LoWPAN network. 6LoW-PAN is designed in such a way that it can transmit the IPv6 packets over LoWPAN network [1] [2] [3] [4] . Security in LoWPAN is provided through authentication of sensor device before any communication happens.
Last MAC and Handshake Authentication methods are mainly used to provide anti-replay protection and authentication [5] for low power devices. The MAC value (hashed value of the message and key) of the previous message is appended to the current message, and the receiver validates the received MAC with the already stored MAC value. However, this technique assumes that the receiver will always accept the first message packet and globally shared keys for authentication. Even though ECC based Diffie-Hellman key exchange with Kerberos authentication [6] for wireless sensor networks provide high security, symmetric encryption and handshake authentication are the highly desirable mechanisms to build the authentication for the successive message transmissions of LoWPAN devices. The public key method of key distribution requires more computational time and energy which leads to overhead for lightweight sensors.
The plaintext of LoWPAN communication can be recovered from a DTLS connection using an OpenSSL implementation of DTLS when using CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode encryption [7] . So it is not a good idea to have DTLS for Key management otherwise DTLS-CBC mode has to be enhanced to manage Lucky thirteen type attacks. To overcome these attacks, LAUP uses ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode of AES-128 encryption. Moreover, compressed DTLS has six flights for authentication, whereas our proposed LAUP has only four flights for authentication and session key distribution.
Existing mechanisms such as lightweight IKEv2, EAKES6Lo, S3K and compressed DTLS are providing lightweight authentication for wireless sensor communication. Lightweight IKEv2 [8] is secure but requires more memory for calculation. EAKES6Lo [9] uses hash functions to ensure the integrity of messages. Though this technique uses symmetric key cryptography, it assumes that the secret key distributed to every node by the remote server. The distribution of secret keys remains a challenge.
S3K symmetric key establishment for IoT [8] uses trust anchor and a resource server for key distribution among clients. However, the secret key is shared between trust anchor and resource server before deployment. The limitation of this idea is that it is not scalable for a vast network and mobility nodes. Maintaining the uniqueness of shared key between trust anchor and resource server is complicated. S3K runs in addition to DTLS and CoAP protocols which in turn, increases the computational overhead of LoWPAN devices. Moreover, the secure connection has to be established between trust anchor and remote server before the key generation process using TLS/DTLS.
After a thorough study on key distribution and authentication of 6LoWPAN networks, we come to the following conclusions. The existing algorithms, which follow pre-shared methods are facing problems while updating the keys and having the assumptions of pre-shared keys. Moreover, they are relying on a key distribution center to distribute the keys which in turn cost more resources and providing protection to key distribution center are another problem in real time. Well established existing algorithms which are using asymmetric method for authentication and key distribution are having the limitation of spending more computational time for authentication. To overcome these existing constraints, we proposed our LAUP algorithm for authentication and key establishment. LAUP leads to the highly secured and easily adaptable authentication method for 6LoWPAN networks. Table 1 shows the explanation of our approach to 6LoWPAN networking. Our proposed LAUP authentication algorithm addresses the significant challenges such as a distribution of preshared keys and usage of resource centers for key distribution in the field of authentication among low power devices. We made observations on how the conventional network protocols compressed to be compatible with LoWPAN Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Our observation showed that Compressed DTLS Handshake [10] uses six flights for authentication and key exchange, whereas our protocol uses only four flights for the same. To our knowledge, LAUP authentication algorithm is the most suitable for 6LoWPAN network and secure authentication algorithm without using preshared keys for authentication and key distribution of LoWPAN devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains related works in the area of authentication and key distribution of LoWPAN networks. Section III describes our proposed work using session request phase, authentication phase, and key distribution phase. Formal verification using Scyther tool is presented in section IV. Section V analyses the efficiency of the LAUP protocol against various attacks of LoWPAN network. Performance evaluation of LAUP using Contiki OS COOJA simulator is demonstrated in section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK APKES(Adaptive Pairwise Key Establishment Scheme) [11] uses pre-distributed pairwise keys to derive pairwise session keys for authentication. SPINS (Security Protocol for Sensor Networks) [12] scheme provides security for wireless sensor communication also obtains keys from the pre-distributed master keys. Although AKES (Adaptive Key Establishment Scheme) [13] system uses PAN ID and address of the sensor for authentication and key distribution, it follows predistribution of keys to derive pairwise session keys. Unlike our LAUP, AKES uses the address of sensors to get the shared secret keys, whereas LAUP uses MAC ID of sensors.
Moreover, sensors (LoWPAN devices) which are using AKES scheme for authentication, to be preloaded with any of the relevant addressing information like 8-byte extended, 2-byte short or 1-byte simple address. Since LAUP uses MAC ID of devices, it does not need any reloading of address. APKES, SPINS and AKES methods discussed previously, but in most cases, attention directed towards pre-distributed keys for key distribution and authentication.
SAKES [14] and EAKES6Lo authentication schemes deal with pre-shared keys among the 6LoWPAN host, 6LoWPAN router, and 6LoWPAN edge router. EAKES6Lo [9] has three phases such as pre-deployment phase, authentication and key establishment phase and handover phase. The remote server distributes private/public keys used by the sensors during authentication. A registration request by the sensor node is sent to the server with sensor ID and its public key. This public key is derived using ECDH (Elliptic Curve DiffieHelman) mechanism which is more power consuming process for LoWPAN devices. But LAUP eliminates this additional power requirement by not using a remote server for preshared keys. LAUP focuses on preventing attacks on transportation layer such as replay attack, a man in the middle attack, and impersonation attack.
GDP (Group Device Pairing) does not need extra hardware devices for preshared keys. Based on symmetric key cryptographic techniques GDP provides secure communication between wireless body area networks. Even though GDP method [15] supports no redistribution of keys, GDP needs human user intervention for verification during authentication. Periodical updates of local keys [16] could prevent sensor compromisation on static nodes. Smaller cryptographic keys play a significant role in providing security for sensor communication [17] . Unlike GDP, LAUP does not need human intervention during authentication and key establishment process. Moreover, LAUP session keys are small and have a periodical update for each session.
III. PROPOSED WORK
Our proposed LAUP provides security to the 6LoWPAN device communication by authenticating the intended 6LoWPAN devices with Edge Router. 6LoWPAN is designed in such a way that it can transmit the IPv6 packets over Low Power Personal Area Network. 6LoWPAN protocol stack adopts bottom-most two layers from IEEE 802.15.4. 6LoWPAN acts as an adaptation layer between the link layer and the network layer. Figure 1 shows [1] , [18] , [19] . LAUP works on transport layer of the 6LoWPAN protocol. 
B. Basic assumptions of proposed work
Every sensor identity ID S (MAC Address of sensor) is registered with the 6LoWPAN Edge Router (6L ER ) and they are physically secured. Our LAUP deals with 6LoWPAN devices which are deployed within the coverage range of 6LoWPAN Edge Router 6L ER . 6L ER knows the PAN ID of LoWPAN network, and we assume that the sensors connected to the LoWPAN network are physically secured. We address Each flight calculates its key for session key distribution by following common key derivation method. LAUP does not use any software or hardware based random number generation scheme to produce nonce values. Instead, the time of message generation on each flight has been taken as nonce respectively. By this way of receiving a nonce value, reduces the extra computational complexity and memory usage of low power devices. Replay Attack, Man in the Middle attack, and impersonation attack by including the MAC values and nonce values. Even the attacker eavesdropped the message; he can not be able to reproduce the same message since the message is in the encrypted form and it needs the exact time of when the packet was generated.
As a result of our LAUP algorithm, a unique session key will be produced by the Edge Router for a sensor claims " SensorHello" request. Figure 3 shows the flow of communication of LAUP between 6LoWPAN device and Edge Router. To encrypt the messages in each flight, we use the AES-128-ECB algorithm. A simple XOR function is used as a hash function to produce MAC values in all the four flights of communication. Figure 4 explains the process flow of LAUP on Edge router. Our proposed LAUP algorithm has three phases for authentication and session key establishment process. 1. Session Request 2. Authentication 3. Key Distribution 1) Session Request phase: 6LS−→6LER:
Session request phase comprises of flight one communication message. In this phase, the 6LoWPAN sensor which is intended to communicate with the 6LoWPAN Edge Router 6L ER sends the following content in its payload to the 6L ER . PAN ID of the network acts as a flight one key to encrypt the messages involved in first flight communication.
The identity(MAC_ID) and the timer value (time generated by the sensor) of the sensor is encrypted by the flight one key called SK1. MAC one value is calculated by applying the XOR function on the encrypted messages. Encrypted identity, encrypted nonce of the sensor, MAC one value and "SensorHello" message are sent as a first flight information to 6L ER . Hence the identity and the nonce value of the sensor is retrieved by the 6L ER .
2) Authentication phase: 6LER −→6LS:
After receiving the flight one information from sensor, MAC one value is calculated at Edge Router by hashing the received encrypted values. Before validating the authenticity of the sensor, the received MAC one value is compared with the calculated MAC one value. If both the values are same, protection against replay attack can be ensured, and the authentication process is going to be carried out by the Edge Router.
Two levels of authentication (Initial level and second level) will be performed by the 6L ER . Flow chart of Edge Router process in Figure 4 explains the two level authentication process in detail. In the Initial level of authentication, the received flight one information are decrypted using an AES-128 algorithm with ECB mode. Retrieved sensor MAC_ID from flight one information is checked against the already registered sensor MAC_ID. If a match is found, then 6L ER generates flight two key SK2 by applying the XOR function on sensor MAC_ID, sensor nonce value and flight one key. Otherwise, 6LER send "You are not a registered sensor" message to the corresponding sensor and terminates the session.
flight two information is generated by the Edge Router and communicated with a sensor which claims authentication for session keys. Edge Router ID and nonce value is encrypted with flight two key SK2 and MAC two is calculated by using a hash function on the resultant encrypted values. Along with the encrypted values and MAC two values, "ERConf" message is sent to the sensor as a second flight information. After receiving flight two information, sensor checks the MAC two value by calculating the same with the procedure followed by the Edge Router for MAC two calculation. If the MAC two is not replayed by any adversaries, then the sensor generates flight two key SK2 and decrypt the received flight two information from the Edge Router. After the above steps are performed, the sensor stores the ID of the Edge Router.
With the retrieved values from flight two packet, the sensor generates flight three key SK3 by applying XOR functions between Edge Router ID and flight two key SK2. flight three information are generated by encrypting the old and new nonce value of sensor and flight two key, with flight three key. Then MAC three is calculated by applying a hash function on the encrypted values. Now flight three information packet is ready to send to Edge Router along with the "Sensor Challenge" message. When the Edge Router receives flight three information from sensor, Edge Router checks whether it has sent flight two information to the intended sensor.
Upon getting positive results of the checking operation, Edge Router starts to process the received flight three information from sensors. Initially Edge Router checks MAC three value by calculating it and compare with the received MAC three value. If the Edge Router found, the packet is not replayed, then proceed to calculate flight three key SK3 otherwise, terminates the session by sending "You have replayed the message".
flight three information are decrypted using flight three key SK3 and Edge Router gets the information like old, the new nonce value of sensor and flight two key SK2 calculated by the sensor. Edge Router does the second level authentication by comparing the nonce value of sensor what it has received from flight two and comparing flight two key SK2 value with the existing information. If the value matches, then it starts to process the further required session key generation. Thus the authentication phase of the sensor is completed by the Edge Router. flight four information are received by the sensor and sensor generates flight four key SK4 using the same method followed by the Edge Router. A sensor checks whether the message is replayed or not by checking the MAC four value with the calculated MAC four . If the flight four message packet, through the checking operation of MAC values, then the sensor decrypts the flight four message and get the session key (K Session ). Thus the key distribution process is completely done by the Edge Router to the sensor by means of communicating four flight messages. This session key is used as a key to encrypt the further communication.
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF ALGORITHM
The Scyther formal verification tool is used to verify the authentication properties of our proposed algorithm. Figure  5 shows the result of the LAUP algorithm using a formal authentication verification tool called Scyther. Definitions of Aliveness, Secrecy, the NonInjective -Agreement, and Non-Injective-Synchronization are defined in [20] , [21] . Figure 5 result shows LAUP algorithm satisfies all the specified authentication properties. Secrecy expresses that certain information is not revealed to an intruder, even though we are communicating this data over an untrusted network. By maintaining the secrecy of Edge Router ID, we can perform a second level authentication of 6LoWPAN devices with Edge Router also the intruder can not get any information of Edge Router ID. Non-Injective Synchronization property of 6LoWPAN sen- 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The session key establishment and authentication method followed by LAUP algorithm are well suited for LoWPAN wireless network sensors. Because,the LAUP algorithm uses lightweight symmetric cryptographic methods to establish a session key and authentication process. Since the MAC address of the 6LoWPAN sensor device and Edge Router are in the encrypted form during the process of LAUP, it will not be disclosed to an eavesdropper. The proposed LAUP algorithm gives reliable protection against the well known LoWPAN security attacks.
REPLAY ATTACK: LAUP protects the transmission of messages from replay attack in all the four flights by adding MAC values, thereby the integrity of the message is maintained throughout the algorithm. So insertion, deletion or modification of messages could not be performed by the attacker. All the four flight information analyzed step by step for what would happen if the attacker captures the flight information. The first flight message packet could not be reproduced by the attacker because the packet contains information such as sensor s unique MAC ID and the timer value of sensor at the time of first flight message generation and most importantly they are appended with MAC one value. The second flight message contains the nonce value of Edge Router encrypted with the unique flight two key SK2. Also, we proved the secrecy of Edge Router ID with Scyther tool, so that adversaries cannot get this information and reproduce it.
This strongly encrypted value cannot be deciphered by the attacker since he does not know the nonce value of Edge Router. The third flight message contains nonce values used in the first flight and the nonce value of the third flight, encrypted with unique flight three key SK3. These ciphertexts are cryptographically strong enough for the lightweight communication and cannot be replayed so that the integrity of the message maintained 
VI. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED AUP ALGORITHM
Our proposed LAUP algorithm for authentication and key distribution algorithm simulated in Contiki OS COOJA simulator environment. Our simulated environmental architecture is shown in Figure 6 . We have taken Wismote as a sensor and the Edge Router as well. The scalability of our proposed LAUP algorithm is checked by adding 65 nodes to the network with the Edge Router. LAUP simulated like an rpl udp client server application whereas an Edge Router acts as a server.
Wismote voltage value and various current values such as CPU current value, low power mode current value, transmission, and reception current values are taken from the Wismote datasheet [22] . Power consumption is calculated using the formula found in [23] . The sensor who wants to communicate with the Edge Router is consuming 0.0456 mw of CPU power, 0.0048 mw of low power mode (lpm) power, 0.1567 mw of transmission power, 0.3300 mw of reception power and 0.5371 mw of total power. We simulated our algorithm with ten sensors. The graph in Figure 7 explains the comparison of computational overhead of LAUP with EAKES6Lo and SAKES [14] overhead values given in [9] . Although we compared the authentication algorithms (EAKES6Lo, SAKES) which Figure  9 shows the power consumption value increases as the number of nodes increases also this graph tells us power consumption while receiving messages is high compared to the lpm, and transmission energy consumption in LoWPAN devices. The difference in power consumption of conventional sensor (without any authentication) and LAUP sensor (with the proposed authentication algorithm) is explained in Figure 8 , and LAUP consumes 0.13079624 mw more power while transmitting messages than the regular sensor communication without authentication. Each flight of LAUP is communicated as a payload of the transport layer. Flight 1 (SensorHello) and Flight 2 (ERConf) consume 64 bytes each. Flight 3 (SensorChallenge) consumes 80 bytes. Flight 4 (Finished) consumes 48 bytes. Graphs in Figure 10 reveals the total processing time of the LAUP algorithm for different sensors over time. From this graph, taking the average of the total processing time of 10 sensors, we proved that our proposed LAUP algorithm takes less time to execute the full authentication algorithm. Up to 65 6LoWPAN devices can be connected without resourceexhaustion to the Edge Router in a specific position. Coding of LAUP will be sent to the reader upon request.
Memory usage of LAUP algorithm is calculated on the sensor, and the Edge Router based on the information found in [24] . Table III summarizes the memory usage of the sensor and the Edge Router. Data segment refers read-write data, and bss segment indicates zero initialized data. The sum of text, data and bss values mentioned in dec section. Flash consumption of LAUP algorithm is 45969 bytes in sensor and 49655 bytes in the Edge Router. RAM use of LAUP algorithm is 13586 bytes in sensor and 14184 bytes in the Edge Router. The total processing time of our proposed LAUP algorithms takes 421.3 msec which is comparatively lower than the processing time of existing algorithms such as EAKES6Lo and SAKES are given in [9] .
VII. CONCLUSION
With the knowledge of existing algorithms and their limitations in the field of authentication and key distribution, we proposed our LAUP algorithm to overcome these limitations. Our algorithm formally verified by the formal verification tool called "Scyther", and we proved that authentication properties such as Aliveness, NonInjective Agreement, Secrecy of keys and Non-Injective Synchronization are maintained. Moreover, LAUP algorithm works with UDP protocol and possible threats such as Replay attack, Man in the Middle attack and Evaluation of the proposed algorithm carried out based on the simulation time. From our evaluation results, we can say that our algorithm is highly secured since LAUP generates the respective keys for each flight using the nonce value of sensors and Edge Router. Additionally, this LAUP algorithm is flexible to update the keys after each session. In future, we will deploy our LAUP using a testbed and compare the result with the simulation results. Also, LAUP will be tested against Sybil attacks using Cooja simulator and the hardware. From the verification tool result and the evaluation result of the simulation, we proved that the LAUP algorithm for authentication and key distribution is highly secured, scalable for LoWPAN networks and flexible enough to update the keys.
